The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era (America in the World Book 35)

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Having recently finished a book on Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which covers the foreign policy period immediately after the Lawrence volume, I had a strong interest in how Lawrence handled the foreign policy that the Nixon Administration inherited. [34] One of the many contributions of the book is its demonstration of how much continuity there was between the end of the Johnson Presidency and Nixon-era foreign policies, a continuity shaped by the impact of the Vietnam War. For those historians who admire the innovations of the Nixon era, or those who deplore what they see as President Richard Nixon and Kissinger’s realpolitik approach compared to the idealism of the Kennedy-Johnson era, this book is a welcome response, making it clear how closely the Nixon Administration ultimately followed in the path set by the end of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency.

Ambition, in and of itself, is not bad,” Forest agrees. The “what” and “why” behind that ambition—the goal someone is striving toward and their motivation for doing so—often matter more. In scientific research, ambition is often assessed by measuring someone’s desire for higher education, career success, prestige, or income. But striving outside the professional realm may actually be healthier, Forest says. The End of Ambition tells a familiar story—the decline of US power after the Vietnam War—in an unfamiliar way. Instead of the usual tales about the anti-war movement and other forces bringing about what historian Allen Matusow called the “unraveling of America,” this book examines something we know surprisingly little about: Vietnam’s impact on US policy in the Third World. [4] Historiographically, this is a surprising gap; the Vietnam War is one of the field’s most heavily examined topics. From nearly every methodological angle and local and transnational scales, the war has inspired an enormous literature. Historically, the neglect is somewhat surprising, too. In 1961, after the journalist Stanley Karnow told Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy that Vietnam would probably be the United States’ greatest challenge, Kennedy reportedly replied, “Vietnam … We have thirty Vietnams a day here.” [5] Delving into the dilemmas facing US policymakers to which Kennedy referred, End of Ambition triangulates the United States, Vietnam, and the Third World as three places whose connections changed each place in unpredictable, at times explosive, ways. It took the pandemic, and losing all his contracts for eight weeks, for him to recalibrate. He now works three minutes’ walk from his house, does the school run each morning and is learning jujitsu alongside his children, aged 10, eight and five. The younger two, he notes with obvious pride, won’t remember a time when he wasn’t there for them. I also accept Prentice’s point that the book would have benefitted from a full chapter on the transition between the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. As it stands, I cover that important subject in a lengthy conclusion that both extends my story into the Nixon presidency and recaps the book’s central argument. Separating those two agendas into a final substantive chapter and a briefer conclusion would have made for a longer book but also perhaps allowed for fuller attention to a period (1969 to 1972 or so) that marks the culmination of the trends that I aim to describe. I can plead only that the book already contained a heavy dose of detailed narrative and that the contours of American policymaking the Nixon years are rather well known thanks to several incisive studies published in recent years.Throughout the book, however, the real question that Lawrence answers is not about Vietnam but rather “Why did American leaders reverse their approach to the Third World in such a short span of time?” (3). I am not convinced that, as the author writes, “Vietnam played a crucial role in leading U.S. leaders to abandon their liberal preoccupations in favor of a more cautious approach.” He argues that “mounting frustration sapped much of the confidence about development and democratization” of earlier in the decade and that the war brought “sharp criticism of the United States in many parts of the Third World” (5).

Mark Lawrence is a prominent, prize-winning historian of US foreign relations. The End of Ambition shows why. The book offers a brilliant interpretation of US policy towards the Third World in the 1960s. It shows how the decade’s early ambition gave way to cynicism and accommodations with reactionary regimes. Lawrence organizes his argument around five cases. They explore US policy towards Brazil, India, Iran, Indonesia, and southern Africa. (The first four cases deal with nation-states; the last, a region.) Macbeth has been thinking about whether or not he should murder Duncan. He reaches the conclusion that the only thing that is motivating him (his 'spur') is ambition which he compares to a horse leaping over an obstacle ('vaulting ambition'). As for the horse and rider, what is on the other side of the obstacle is unknown - it could, of course, be disaster. However, before Macbeth can complete the thought and turn away from the crime, he is interrupted by Lady Macbeth entering. Had she not appeared at this point, the outcome might have been different. The announcement comes ahead of the UK co-hosting the Climate Ambition Summit on Saturday 12 December, which will coincide with the fifth anniversary of the historic Paris Agreement. The summit calls on countries around the world to submit ambitious NDCs or other climate plans as we head towards the UN COP26 climate talks, which the UK government is hosting in Glasgow next year. A groundbreaking new history of how the Vietnam War thwarted U.S. liberal ambitions in the developing world and at home in the 1960s Finally, a major historiographical question that I hope Lawrence takes up in his response to this roundtable is whether we should see Johnson as a transitional or a transformational foreign policy president. After reading this book, the answer remains blurry but the fault lines appear sharper than ever. Certainly, there should no longer be any question that Johnson failed to carry forward the Kennedy legacy in almost every foreign policy area. Still, was he closer to President Richard Nixon or to his predecessor? Lawrence writes that “Johnson anticipated . . . the approach embraced by Nixon and Kissinger” (7) and that his presidency was “a crucial period of transition” (10). It would seem, therefore, that the answer is transition rather than transformation.Mark Lawrence’s The End of Ambition is an extraordinarily impressive book, which has already been honored by the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations with its Robert H. Ferrell prize. Superbly written and researched, Lawrence’s manuscript is a genuine joy to read. It avoids jargon, is structured logically and consistently, and explains complicated political, military, and economic situations in a readable and understandable fashion. The footnotes reflect how much information Lawrence has managed to summarize and analyze in clear and compelling prose. I really stand in awe at how well he has handled this material. Ferguson GT, et al. Effect of budesonide/formoterol pressurized metered-dose inhaler on exacerbations versus formoterol in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease: the 6-month, randomized RISE (Revealing the Impact of Symbicort in reducing Exacerbations in COPD) study. Respir Med. 2017; 132: 31‐41 Lawrence’s treatment of American policy toward South Africa and particularly the issue of Rhodesia or the future Zimbabwe highlights the degree that American domestic politics pushed the Johnson administration toward a more active policy, from which it subsequently retreated, especially as Vietnam escalated in importance. Although the Nixon administration carried its indifference to the white-ruled country much further, Lawrence shows the degree to which the Johnson administration retreated from its strong initial stand with the British. [40] Similarly, the close American military relationship with the Shah of Iran, which is often seen as starting in the Nixon administration, appears to have been shaped during the Johnson years, especially as the British signaled their retreat from their East of Suez positions. [41] Finally, Lawrence makes it clear that domestic politics in India, particularly Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s political position in the Congress Party, played a significant role in preventing a closer relationship with the United States. The Nixon Administration’s subsequent ‘tilt’ toward Pakistan was hardly inevitable, but the deterioration of US relations with India began well before the 1971 war. [42] She seems to understand her husband well and displays her own philosophy of power, where only those who are able to set aside morality can rise to greatness. When she receives Macbeth’s letter and learns about the witches’ prophecy she says: “Yet do I fear thy nature In a tragic play, the fatal flaw refers to the basic mistake in the central character's personality which drives their actions. Macbeth is basically a good man who goes wrong. He is driven by a need for power which eventually sets him on a path to his own destruction. His wife shares this fatal flaw with him.