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To fix perceptions of military power, we said that “in 2027, the US military is overall about 30 percent stronger than the Russian military.” Had we omitted information about military power, respondents might have guessed based on hawkishness/dovishness or gesture type. Assumptions about military power, in turn, could affect willingness to reciprocate, introducing confounding. The US-Weak study was nearly identical, except that the military balance in the Arctic was flipped: Russia was 30 percent more powerful than the US in the Arctic, with nine military bases to the US's seven. Thus, the US-Weak study represents a scenario in which Americans might be particularly reluctant to reciprocate.

Our study also has implications for the literatures on trust building among adversaries and the role of reputation in foreign policy. While previous work emphasizes the character of successful conciliatory gestures, Footnote 45 we highlight how leader reputation can influence whether a peace overture is perceived as credible. Recent research on crisis bargaining finds that a leader's past behavior shapes expectations about future behavior. Footnote 46 Here we add to these insights by showing that a foreign leader's reputation for hawkishness/dovishness can affect preferences about rapprochement. In recent decades, scholars of international relations have embraced the idea that major policy shifts are best accomplished by unlikely leaders. Numerous studies have argued that when making peace with foreign rivals, hawkish leaders have a domestic political advantage. Empirical research has supported this conjecture, finding that domestic audiences tend to respond more favorably when hawks deliver the olive branch to a foreign rival compared to when doves do the same. Footnote 1 Nov 20 From the U.S. to Japan, You Can Control the Life-Size Moving Gundam from the Comfort of Your Own Home The lottery will be available from September 12 onwards in Family Mart outlets and other convenience stores, bookstores, hobby shops, game centers and JUMP shops. The price for each attempt at the lottery is 680 yen (including tax). Recent evidence suggests that reputations do not only matter domestically: observers also make guesses about foreign actors’ intentions (and therefore, future behavior) based on country or leader reputation. Footnote 18 Following this logic, when assessing whether a foreign adversary genuinely wants peace, voters and policymakers should consider the foreign leader's reputation.Both studies randomized two key features of the scenario: the foreign leader's reputation (hawk vs. dove), and the strength of the cooperative gesture (low cost or costly). We also randomized the US president's party (Democrat or Republican) and reputation (again, hawk or dove). We did this so respondents would not draw conclusions about the US president based on the foreign leader's reputation and gesture, which could introduce confounding. Footnote 31 In general, our design mirrored Mattes and Weeks’ study of the domestic hawk's advantage for comparability. Footnote 32 A metallic color variant of Deku's figure featured in Prize A will also be offered as the "Last One" prize as well as a prize in the "Second Chance Campaign". We used two different approaches to assess whether our results hinge on the demographic and attitudinal composition of our sample. Footnote 43 First, we interacted the five elitelike traits with our experimental treatments. With few exceptions, those who scored high on these traits reacted no differently from regular voters, consistent with Kertzer's finding about the remarkable similarity of elite and mass reactions to experimental treatments. Second, we carried out the hawk/dove analyses on subsets of individuals who most closely resemble political elites, using a variety of definitions of political elites. Our conclusions do not change when we consider subjects in these elitelike subsets only. Footnote 44 Of course, it remains possible that political elites differ from ordinary voters in ways not captured by these traits; for example, perhaps political elites are aware of the idea that hawks have a domestic advantage, and would therefore be more sympathetic to cooperation with hawks. Nonetheless, we do not see reason to think that, had we fielded our experiment on US political elites, their reactions would have differed from those of ordinary voters. H2b (Costly Signaling): Individuals are more likely to support reciprocation of a stronger gesture. Treatments in parentheses denote the US-Weak study, which differed from the US-Strong study only in the balance of local military power.

H1a (Sincerity 1) Individuals are more likely to believe that a foreign leader wants peace if the foreign leader is a dove rather than a hawk. Footnote 19We next described Russia in 2027. We noted that “Russia remains a non-democracy” and described a fictional male Russian leader who had entered office two years prior; we chose a fictional leader so we could manipulate reputation for hawkishness/dovishness. Half of our respondents read that the Russian leader “has a reputation for favoring military solutions over diplomatic ones,” and the other half that he “has a reputation for favoring diplomatic solutions over military ones.” We reinforced these treatments by mentioning previous statements by the Russian president about military conflict versus peaceful diplomacy. Footnote 33 Protracted rivalries are costly, driving up defense spending, discouraging trade, and reducing the prospects for both formal and informal cooperation. Given these costs, rivals may consider pursuing rapprochement. Numerous studies have examined how leader reputation influences the peacemaking process, particularly how reputation affects leaders’ ability to rally domestic support for peace. These studies largely conclude that “hawks”—those with a reputation for favoring conflictual and competitive policies—find it easier than “doves”—those known for preferring diplomacy and cooperation—to sell peace at home. Going against type reassures voters that the policy is sound and that the leader has moderate preferences. Footnote 13 Thus, hawks who deliver the olive branch are more likely to receive domestic support than doves, an idea supported by much empirical evidence. Footnote 14 Interestingly, we found a statistically significant dove's advantage, that is, support for H1, when the US started in a position of weakness but the Russian gesture was costly ( Figure 2). Why did the dove's advantage materialize for a costly but not a low-cost gesture? We suspect that it has to do with the balance of power and how the combination of the Russian leader's gesture and US reciprocation would change that balance. Given the US position of vulnerability at the outset of the US-Weak scenario, a low-cost Russian gesture meant that closing any US bases would reify the US's relative weakness. Voters were extremely unlikely to support reciprocation in this scenario even when they thought the leader was sincere. Footnote 40 Put differently, the unattractiveness of the US remaining in a position of local military vulnerability seems to generate a floor effect that squashes the dove's advantage.