The Eastern Fleet and the Indian Ocean, 1942-1944: The Fleet that Had to Hide

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a b c d e f Watson, Graham. "Royal Navy Organisation in World War 2, 1939–1945: EASTERN FLEET 1.1942-EAST INDIES FLEET 11.44-". naval-history.net. Gordon Smith, 19 September 2015 . Retrieved 11 July 2018. Charles Stephenson's well-researched and absorbing narrative gives this forgotten fleet the recognition it deserves. SeaGull Feb 21 - Apr 21 The book overall serves as a good introduction to British naval operations that are far too often given scant coverage in general accounts of the naval history of the Second World War." The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord (Volume 32, No. 1, Published 1 November 2022), the journal of the Canadian Nautical Research Society/Société canadienne pour la recherche nautique. Senior Royal Navy appointments" . http://www.gulabin.com/armynavy/pdf/Senior%20Royal%20Navy%20Appointments%201900-.pdf . Retrieved 2 September 2012. The Royal Navy is outnumbered and outgunned in the air, with three fleet carriers — all of them smaller than their Japanese counterparts — and one nearly useless light carrier. The British do have four old and painfully slow R-class battleships and the much more useful Warspite, newly rebuilt in an American shipyard. British cruisers are vastly inferior to those of the Japanese in both numbers and capability, as is the case with the British, Australian and Dutch destroyers.

Rear-Admiral, Commanding, 5th Cruiser Squadron and Second-in-Command, East Indies Fleet/Far East Fleet Until 1941, the main threat to British interests in the region was the presence of German commerce raiders ( auxiliary cruisers) and submarines. The fleet had trade protection as its first priority and was required to escort convoys and eliminate the raiders. The Germans had converted merchant ships to act as commerce raiders and allocated supply ships to maintain them. The location and destruction of these German raiders consumed much British naval effort until the last raider – Michel – was sunk in October 1943. [6] Japanese intelligence on the morning of 5 April 1942 indicated that British carriers were absent, and the Japanese morning air search was limited accordingly. [8] At dawn, Japanese aerial reconnaissance aircraft flew off to the south-west and north-west; they would fly out to a maximum of 200 miles (320km) over the next few hours. A reconnaissance Fulmar launched from Force A at 08:00 spotted one of the Japanese aircraft at the extreme edge of the south-west search area at 08:55 about 140 miles (230km) ahead of Force A. [28]

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O'Hara, Vincent (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea: the great navies at war in the Mediterranean theater, 1940-1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591146488. At the same time, Fuchida was saddened to see the vaunted Royal Navy collapsing so easily before him. “This is the end of the British Empire and British sea power,” he mused. “What a pity—an era of world history lay dying before my eyes.” Until the Second World War, the Indian Ocean had been a British "lake". It was ringed by significant British and Commonwealth possessions and much of the strategic supplies needed in peace and war had to pass across it: i.e. Persian oil, Malayan rubber, Indian tea, Australian and New Zealand foodstuffs. Britain also utilised Australian and New Zealand manpower; hence, safe passage for British cargo ships was critical. [3]

Appendix V — Execution By Japanese Of Fleet Air Arm Officers". Royal New Zealand Navy . http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Navy-a5.html . Retrieved 2 September 2012. Japanese intelligence on the composition of the British Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean [8] was reasonably accurate, [6] The Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf was responsible for administering Royal Navy ships and establishments in the Persian Gulf. He was initially located at Basra, in Mandatory Iraq, then later at HMS Juffair in Bahrain from 1901 to 1972. His command was part of the East Indies Station, then the Eastern Fleet, then the East Indies Fleet. [19]Gill, G. Hermon (1968). Volume II – Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945. Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 27 August 2006 . Retrieved 20 November 2006.

O'Hara, Vincent (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea: the great navies at war in the Mediterranean theater, 1940–1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1591146483.Shores, Christopher; Cull, Brian & Izawa, Yasuho (2002). Bloody Shambles, Volume One: The Drift to War to the Fall of Singapore. Grub Street.

Until 1941, the main threat to British interests in the region was the presence of German commerce raiders ( auxiliary cruisers) and submarines. The fleet had trade protection as its first priority and was required to escort convoys and eliminate the raiders. The Germans had converted merchant ships to act as commerce raiders and allocated supply ships to maintain them. The location and destruction of these German raiders consumed much British naval effort until the last raider - Michel - was sunk in October 1943. [5] So this is the Eastern Fleet,” ran Vice Admiral Sir James Fownes Somerville’s signal. “Never mind. Many a good tune is played on an old fiddle.” Better than the average Pen & Sword publication but this is more to do with the writer. Major omission is a proper bibliography. During World War II, the British Eastern Fleet included, from time to time, a number of warships from other Allied nations, such as Australia, France ( Free French Navy), the Netherlands, India ( Royal Indian Navy), New Zealand and the United States. Major ships attached to the Eastern Fleet, or where indicated, East Indies Fleet, included: But the Admiralty approved Somerville’s move, signaling that the battle fleet must “get out of danger at the earliest moment.”

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Providing a worthwhile narrative on a less well-known subject, this book serves as a reminder that, even during a global conflict, kinetic action remains only a part of what navies ask warships to do. The NYMAS Review When Fuchida arrived, Hermes was already sinking. He noticed Lieutenant Shokei Yamada, who led the Akagi’s dive bombers, gesticulating urgently, so Fuchida flew alongside his plane. Yamada pointed at his nose, then downward, and smiled. Fuchida followed the finger and found the Vampire sinking. Fuchida understood. Yamada had his heart set on bombing the carrier, and rather than waste his bomb, had dropped it on the destroyer instead. A rather lot of the book is also focusing on various debates between admirals and other war commanders as well with the political level and of course Winston Churchill. It is surprising how negative picture of Churchill is presented by the opinions of admirals and generals of the British forces. If this picture, as presented through the lens of the Indian Ocean would be the view from all major officers and all theatres of operations, it is hard to see how Winston Churchill could get anything done at all.